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Abstract—Machine Learning models are vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks that rely on perturbing the input data. This
work proposes a novel strategy using Autoencoder Deep Neural
Networks to defend a machine learning model against two
gradient-based attacks: The Fast Gradient Sign attack and
Fast Gradient attack. First we use an autoencoder to denoise
the test data, which is trained with both clean and corrupted
data. Then, we reduce the dimension of the denoised data
using the hidden layer representation of another autoencoder.
We perform this experiment for multiple values of the bound
of adversarial perturbations, and consider different numbers
of reduced dimensions. When the test data is preprocessed
using this cascaded pipeline, the tested deep neural network
classifier yields a much higher accuracy, thus mitigating the
effect of the adversarial perturbation.
I. INTRODUCTION
State of the art machine learning algorithms have rev-
olutionized automated classification technologies in various
fields like computer vision, natural language processing, and
biometric information security [1] [2] [3]. High classifica-
tion accuracy in the foregoing applications has led to the
deployment of learning algorithms in a multitude of environ-
ments. Yet, recent studies have exposed the vulnerabilities
of accurate machine learning classification in the presence
of adversarial attacks [4]. More specifically, the injection
of visually imperceptible l2 and l∞ bounded perturbations
into the input testing data has shown to render even the
most robust classifiers useless. For example, both Support
Vector Machines (SVMs) and Artificial Neural Networks
with robust classification metrics have resulted in nearly 0%
accuracy when processing perturbed data [5] [6]. This paper
presents novel defense strategies, which are not only capable
of combatting such adversarial attacks, but are also more
robust than current standards in the literature.
In this study, we consider an attacker-defender scenario.
The attacker aims to optimally perturb input data such
that it causes a trained multi-layer fully-connected artificial
neural network to misclassify the input sample. The defender
employs various defense strategies to resist the misclassifi-
cation caused by the attacker. We consider three defense
strategies: a stand-alone Denoising Autoencoder (DAE), a
reduced-dimension representation of the input obtained from
a fully-connected autoencoder neural network, and finally a
cascade of the aforementioned defenses connected in series.
Each defense strategy is tested in both a semi-white box
environment, in which the adversary has full knowledge
of the trained neural network classifier architecture (but
not the parameter initialization values), and a black-box
environment in which the adversary has no prior knowledge
of the trained classifier architecture. In either scenario, the
attacker is blind to the pre-processing defense algorithms.
Finally, we assume that the attacker employs an untargeted
misclassification attack. In other words, the attacker’s sole
objective is misclassification, without particular emphasis on
a specific output.
A. Related Work
Several attacks that rely on effective perturbation of the
input samples exist in the literature, such as the DeepFool
algorithm [7], the Carlini and Wagner l2 attack [8], and
the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) algorithm [9]. Each attack
relies on perturbing the input sample slightly differently by
optimizing different network parameters. Previous studies
have investigated the effectiveness of using sparsity as a
defense against such adversarial perturbations. For example,
Z. Marzi et al. [5] shows that enforcing sparsity by taking the
K out of N largest elements in magnitude, and zeroing the
rest, for an inputted classifier sample in the wavelet domain,
successfully decreases the misclassification caused by an
adversarial attack on a Support Vector Machine (SVM).
Furthermore, A. N. Bhagoji et al. [6] shows that projecting
high dimensional data onto a lower dimensional subspace
using Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is effective in
decreasing adversarial success. Further, A. N. Bhagoji et
al. [6] extend their defense strategies beyond SVMs and
successfully demonstrate PCA as a successful defense in
multi-class scenarios on artificial neural networks. In this
paper, we present three distinct defense strategies to combat
adversarial attacks on deep neural networks that result in
more robust defenses than previous works have achieved.
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Furthermore, S. Gu et al. [11] showed that DAEs can
be used to effectively remove Gaussian noise injected into
input samples, but it does not explore their application in
the scenario of an adversarial attack. However, S. Gu et
al. [11] does reveal that multi-layer denoising autoencoder
architectures can be used to effectively eliminate injected
noise. We aim to extend the use of DAEs in different
scenarios so that they can be used as a defense against
perturbed inputs. Specifically, we train a DAE architecture
capable of outputting clean samples regardless of whether
the inputted data was benign or corrupted.
B. Contributions
We present three novel defense strategies to combat adver-
sarial machine learning attacks: The Denoising Autoencoder
(DAE), dimensionality reduction using the learned hidden
layer of a fully-connected autoencoder neural network, and
a cascade of the DAE followed by the learned reduced di-
mensional subspace in series. Each of our defense strategies
are used as pre-processing defense mechanisms which aim
to reduce the effect of the adversary on a trained fully-
connected multi-layer artificial neural network. We show
that the DAE alone is an effective defense capable of
increasing the average accuracy across a noise range of
[0.00, 0.50] from 13.76% to 95.55% in a semi-white box
environment, and from 18.54% to 78.37% in a black-box
environment under an l∞ bounded attack. Furthermore, we
show that dimensionality reduction using an autoencoder is
also an effective defense against adversarial attacks, that is
capable of increasing the average accuracy across a noise
range of [0.00, 0.50] from 13.76% to 51.09% in a semi-
white box environment, and from 18.54% to 48.62% in a
black box environment under an l∞ bounded attack. Finally,
our novel cascaded architecture increases the average
accuracy across the same noise range from 13.76% to
96.27% in a semi-white box environment, and from 18.54%
to 79.88% in a black box environment under an l∞ bounded
attack. We also obtain similar results for attacks induced
according to the l2 norm.1 To the best of our knowledge,
the gains in accuracy achieved in this study have not
been achieved by any other defense strategies against
adversarial attacks for neural network classifiers.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks
Neural networks are vulnerable to different types of ad-
versarial attacks aimed at causing misclassification. Attacks
which corrupt training data are called poisoning attacks
[12], resulting in an incorrectly trained classifier. Attacks
which corrupt test data are called evasion attacks. While
several methods exist to optimally perturb neural network
inputs, this paper explores two gradient-based evasion attack
methods: the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) attack and the Fast
1Code is available at https://github.com/rajeevsahay/ae-defenses
Gradient (FG) attack. The FGS attack [13] adds an l∞-
bounded perturbation η such that η = ||x − x˜||∞, where
x and x˜ correspond to the original and corrupted sample,
respectively. This results in the following corruption:
x˜(η) = x+ η ∗ sign(OxJ(θ, x, y)), (1)
where x˜(η) is the perturbed version of the input data sample
x, whose predicted class is y, and J(θ, x, y) represents the
cost function used to train the neural network, where θ
represents the network weights. The sign of the gradient
of this cost function is scaled by η and added to the
benign data sample to perturb it. A moderately low choice
of η, below an approximate threshold of 0.15, results in
visually imperceptible perturbations. We consider a range
of η between 0.0 and 0.5.
A variation of the FGS attack is the Fast Gradient (FG)
attack, which introduces an l2 bounded error such that  =
||x− x˜||2. This results in the corrupted sample as shown in
(2).
x˜() = x+  ∗ OxJ(θ, x, y)||OxJ(θ, x, y)||2 (2)
For l2-bounded perturbations, the perturbations are imper-
ceptible for larger bounds as well. We consider a range of
 between 0.0 and 3.5.
There are different categories of attacks, based on how
much knowledge the adversary has about the trained model
and the defense mechanism. A white box scenario is when
the adversary has access to the trained model and the
defense strategy. It is highly unlikely for an adversary to
have so much information about the classifier, which is
why we omit this scenario in our experiments. A slightly
more realistic scenario is the semi-white box setting, in
which the adversary has access to the training dataset and
classifier architecture, but is blind to the defense mechanism.
An even more practical setting is the black-box setting,
where the attacker has access to the training data only, and
arbitrarily (or using imperfect knowledge) selects a classifier
architecture, based on which it generates its adversarial
examples. The black box scenario represents the most realis-
tic attacker-defender situation and illustrates the application
of our adversarial defense algorithms in defender-attacker
mismatched classifier scenarios.
B. Experimental Setup
We evaluate the effect of our defenses on a neural network
classifier trained on the MNIST data set [14], which consists
of 60,00 training examples and 10,000 testing examples of
black-and-white handwritten digits centered and normalized
to a of size 28 x 28 pixels, where each image represents
a digit from 0 to 9. Furthermore, each pixel value is
normalized to lie in [0, 1]. We consider a fully connected
neural network classifier with an input layer to accept the
784 pixel values followed by two layers of 100 neurons each.
The output layer contains 10 neurons, which correspond to
one of ten possible digit classes. Throughout this paper,
this model is referred to as the FC-100-100-10 architec-
ture. In the black box scenario, the adversary generates
perturbations based on an FC-200-200-100-10 architecture,
whose name corresponds to the same naming convention
as that of the FC-100-100-10 model. Each layer has ReLu
activation functions, except the last layer, which has a
softmax activation function. The batch size used for training
is 200, the optimizer is adam, the loss function is categorical
crossentropy, and 100 epochs are used to train both the
classifier and the autoencoders. It is important to note that
distinct FC-100-100-10 architectures were trained for each
of the four attack environments, which results in slightly
different baseline accuracy values due to unique parameter
initilizations in each scenario. All neural networks were
implemented using the Keras library [10] in Python, and
adversarial perturbations are generated using the Cleverhans
library [9].
C. Defense Strategies
Because adversarial perturbations decrease classification
accuracy, a variety of defense strategies have been proposed
to combat this effect, such as network distillation [15] and
adversarial retraining [13]. Here, we process the test data
using autoencoders before classifying it, with an aim to
recover the performance degradation due to perturbations.
Autoencoders can be used to denoise and learn compact
representations of data. An autoencoder is a neural network
that attempts to reproduce an output, which is approximately
equivalent to the input through learned encoder and decoder
functions.
A traditional autoencoder learns the underlying mani-
fold of the training data’s distribution, which is used to
reconstruct the input at the output. This manifold can be
used advantageously by training the DAE with benign and
corrupted samples that are mapped only to clean samples. As
a result, the autoencoder will learn an underlying vector field
that points in the direction of the manifold in which the clean
samples lie. Thus, upon the introduction of a perturbation,
the magnitude of each arrow in the vector field will indicate
the direction in which the data must be moved to map the
sample to its clean representation. After training the DAE
using both uncorrupted and corrupted data, the output of the
propagated data will consist only of clean samples.
Furthermore, when a hidden layer of an autoencoder
contains lesser dimensions than the input sample, we can
also use it to learn a compressed representation of the input.
This is achieved by constructing a bottleneck architecture
in which the input and output have an identical number
of units, but the hidden layer consists of the number of
units corresponding to the desired reduced dimension. The
output of the hidden layer of the trained autoencoder is then
extracted and used as the input into the classifier.
1) Denoising using Autoencoders: Propagating the data
through an autoencoder forces the network to learn the
underlying manifold of the input by mapping noisy data
back onto the clean manifold distribution of the data. There-
fore, the output of the Denoising Autoencoder (DAE) is
an uncorrupted version of the input sample. However, to
generate such a model, the training dataset must consist of
both clean and corrupted samples and their corresponding
clean, uncorrupted ideal outputs. For both considered semi-
white box and black box attack environments, the defender
simulates adversarial training data, using the FGS attack, by
adding perturbations, with a magnitude of η = 0.25, to the
training samples based on the gradient of the FC-100-100-10
model. The DAE is then trained with both clean and per-
turbed data. The architecture of the denoising autoencoder
was chosen to be a fully connected neural network with the
following architecture: 784-256-128-64-128-256-784. The
DAE is then trained with 60,000 clean data samples, and
60,000 corrupted data samples, and optimized using the
mean squared error cost function over 150 epochs using a
batch size of 256. The DAE’s mean squared error reaches a
minimum at 0.0049, indicating the network’s robust ability
to approximate the uncorrupted input of both clean and
perturbed samples. Our experiments revealed that the DAE
trained to combat l∞ attacks delivers a more robust defense,
compared to using a DAE trained to combat l2 attacks, even
when combatting l2 bounded attacks. Thus, all FG attacks
were defended using the DAE trained to combat l∞ attacks.
2) Dimensionality Reduction using Autoencoders: The
output of the bottleneck layer of an autoencoder gives a
compressed representation of the data. We experiment with
different numbers of hidden layers to compress the initial
784 input dimensions to a smaller number of dimensions
k. The various values of k considered are 331, 100, 80,
60, 40 and 20, with different magnitudes of the perturbation
bound to see which compressed representation gives the best
accuracy. Instead of using all 784 input features, we use a
lesser number of features as the input data, both for training
and for testing. This also means that the size of the input
layer changes, which means that it is unnecessary to train
it with the architecture that uses 784 input dimensions. For
each value of k, the autoencoder architecture used was 784-
k-784. Each model was a fully connected neural network
trained with the MNIST training set of 60,000 samples.
3) Cascaded Defense: We consider a novel defense strat-
egy, in which we cascade the DAE with dimensionality
reduction. First, we denoise the test data using the denoising
autoencoder, after which we reduce its dimensionality using
the hidden layer representation of an autoencoder, before
sending it as an input into the classifier. Both methods
are implemented in series identically to their independent
workings.
III. RESULTS
In this section, we show the efficacy of each pre-
processing defense mechanism used in this study in four
distinct attack environments: the semi-white box FGS attack,
the semi-white box FG attack, the black box FGS attack,
and the black box FG attack. For each of the four attack
environments, we first show the accuracy of classifying
the MNIST testing set plotted against the perturbation
magnitude with no defensive mechanism. We then show
the effectiveness of the DAE as a stand-alone defense,
followed by the effectiveness of dimensionality reduction
as a stand-alone defense. Finally, the results produced from
cascading the DAE with dimensionality reduction for use as
a single defense is shown for different numbers of reduced
dimensions k, where k ∈ {20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 331}.
A. Semi-White Box FGS Attack
The FC-100-100-10 classifier yields an initial classifica-
tion test accuracy, after being trained on a disparate training
set, of 98.00%, which confirms the robustness of the clas-
sifier to clean input data that. However, after injecting each
input sample with an l∞ bounded noise, with a magnitude
perturbation of η = 0.25, the same classifier yields an
accuracy of 2.55%. To combat such an attack, the corrupted
data is propagated through the DAE, and its output is then
input into the classifier. After using the DAE to defend an
attack on the magnitude of η = 0.25, the classifier is able
to achieve a 95.96% classification accuracy. Similarly, as
shown in Figure 1, we see that defending an attack using
the DAE improves classification accuracy nearly 30-fold for
all values of η ∈ [0.00, 0.50]. Specifically, we are able to
achieve an average classification accuracy of 95.55% over
all tested noise levels, which is quite significant compared to
the average accuracy of 13.76%, achieved using no defense.
Using the hidden layer of an autoencoder to reduce the
number of dimensions occupied by input samples results
to an increase in accuracy against adversarial attacks. For
example, injecting a perturbation of η = 0.25 into the
testing data, and then using an autoencoder to extract the
k = 40 most significant features of the corrupted input
for classification by the FC-100-100-10 model, increases the
accuracy from 2.55% to 46.29%. Furthermore, reducing the
dimensionality to k = 40 results in an average classifica-
tion accuracy of 51.09% across all tested noise levels, as
compared to an average accuracy of 13.76% classification
accuracy when the perturbed data is processed without any
defense. Therefore, using a reduced dimension of k = 40
provides the best dimensionality reduction defense for the
semi-white box FGS attack. The specific improvements in
accuracy for all tested levels of noise are shown in Figure 1
below.
The series combination of the DAE followed by dimen-
sionality reduction, using k = 80 reduced dimensions,
provides the best defense compared to using either defense
independently. The cascaded defense in which the the de-
noised data is reduced to 80 dimension yields an average
classification accuracy of 96.27%, which is greater than
both the 95.55% average classification accuracy, achieved by
using only the DAE, and the 46.29% average classification
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Fig. 1: Results for Semi-White Box FGS Attack with
standalone DAE and Dimensionality Reduction defenses.
accuracy, achieved by the most robust dimensionality reduc-
tion defense of k = 40. Figure 2 below shows the accuracy
of each cascaded defense for all tested noise levels.
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Fig. 2: Results for Semi-White Box FGS Attack with a
cascaded DAE and Dimensionality Reduction defense.
B. Semi-White Box FG Attack
The injection of adversarial noise bounded under the l2
constraint into testing data, without deploying any defense,
results in an average accuracy of 27.79% for  ∈ [0, 3.5].
However, using the DAE trained to combat l∞ bounded
attacks as a defense, the FC-100-100-10 is able to achieve
an average accuracy of 85.30% over the same noise range.
Figure 3 below shows the specific accuracy attained for
each noise level before and after introducing the corruption
without employing a defense, as well as the classification
accuracy of each tested noise level after using the DAE as a
defense and then using the FC-100-100-10 classifier model.
Deploying dimensionality reduction as a defense also
proves to increase accuracy. Reducing the dataset to k = 80
dimensions results in the most robust dimensionality re-
duction classification by increasing the average accuracy
from 27.79% to 76.83% across the entire tested noise
range. However, using a reduced dimension of k = 40
and k = 60 results in an average classification accuracy of
76.03% and 76.48%, respectively. Using a lower dimension
of k = 20 yields an average accuracy of 69.12%, indicating
that relevant features of the data are lost at high levels of
compression. Figure 3 below shows specific accuracies for
each tested noise level for different numbers of reduced
dimensions. The cascaded architecture, on average, does
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Fig. 3: Results for Semi-White Box FG Attack with stan-
dalone DAE and Dimensionality Reduction defenses.
not outperform the stand-alone DAE defense for any of the
experimented reduced dimensions. The cascaded defenses
in which k = 40, k = 60, and k = 80 produce an average
classification accuracy of 84.68%, 85.23%, and 85.10%,
respectively, whereas using the DAE alone yields an average
classification accuracy of 85.30%. As shown in Figure 4
below, the aforementioned reduced dimensions improve the
accuracy when used in a cascade, as compared to only the
reduced dimensions alone, but the cascaded defense is never
able to achieve greater robustness than merely using the
DAE as defense.
C. Black Box FGS Attack
As mentioned above, the initial testing accuracy of the
FC-100-100-10 model is 98.05%, which confirms the ro-
bustness of the classifier after it has been trained with
similar, but disparate, training data. After the attacker has
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Fig. 4: Results for Semi-White Box FG Attack with a
cascaded DAE and Dimensionality Reduction defense.
generated an independent model, corresponding to an FC-
200-200-100-10 architecture, each input is attacked accord-
ing to (1), where J() corresponds to the cost function of
the attackers model. The corrupted inputs are then passed
into the defenders classifier model. The average accuracy,
without a defense, is 18.54% over η ∈ [0.00, 0.50]. After de-
ploying the stand-alone DAE defense, the defenders model
achieves an increased average accuracy of 78.37% over the
same noise range. Figure 5 shows the accuracy achieved for
each tested noise level with and without the DAE defense.
The best dimensionality reduction defense, which is
achieved using k = 60, results in an average accuracy
of 48.62%, which is greater than the average accuracy of
18.54% obtained with no defense. Furthermore, using k =
80 produces an average accuracy of 48.20%. We observe that
using K > 80 allows the reduced dimensional representation
to retain more noise than necessary, reducing the average
accuracy whereas k < 40 forces the representation to extort
relevant features. This trend can be seen in Figure 5, which
shows the accuracy of different noise levels for each reduced
dimensional representation of the data.
The cascaded architecture defense using k = 60 improves
the average accuracy from 18.54% to 79.88%. Furthermore,
using k = 20 and k = 40 results in average accuracies of
79.59% and 79.33%, respectively. Each of these cascaded
architectures outperforms the DAE as a stand-alone defense,
which produces an average accuracy of 78.37% across
the entire tested noise range. This phenomenon does not
contradict earlier observations about compression reducing
accuracy due to the extortion of relevant data features as
this trend would still be prevalent for further compressions
of the data (k < 20). Figure 6 below shows the accuracy of
each tested noise level for the cascaded defense consisting
of different compression levels.
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D. Black Box FG Attack
FC-100-100-10 classifier in this scenario achieves an ac-
curacy of 97.88% on the MNIST test data with neither attack
nor defense. Introducing an attack based on a disparate FC-
200-200-100-10 architecture reduces the average accuracy to
31.08% for  ∈ [0, 3.5]. Deploying the DAE defense, which
was trained to combat l∞ bounded attacks generated from
the FC-100-100-10 classifier, improves the average accuracy
to 69.14%. Figure 7 below shows the attained accuracies
at each tested noise level with and without the defense.
The trend confirms that the DAE can effectively improve
accuracy in a mismatched architecture setting.
Using dimensionality reduction as a stand-alone defense
proves to effectively increase the average accuracy in this
setting. The most robust defense is achieved using k =
40, which leads to an average accuracy of 60.48% over
 ∈ [0, 3.5]. Furthermore, using k = 60 results in an
average accuracy of 59.83%, whereas using k = 20 results
in an average accuracy of 56.35%. The loss of accuracy
experienced by the increase or decrease in the number of
dimensions further confirms the retention of excess noise
or extortion of relevant features, respectively, for a reduced
dimensional representation of the input. Figure 7 shows the
accuracy at each tested noise level for different reduced
dimensional subspaces as stand-alone defenses.
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Fig. 7: Results for Black Box FG Attack with standalone
DAE and Dimensionality Reduction defenses.
Similar to the semi-white box FG attack, the cascaded
defense does not, on average, outperform the stand-alone
DAE for any of the experimented reduced dimensions. The
most robust cascaded defense is the architecture in which
the DAE is followed by a reduced dimension of k = 80,
results in an average accuracy of 68.78% across the tested
noise range. Also, using a reduced dimension of k = 60
and k = 100 results in average accuracies of 68.22% and
68.56%, respectively, whereas the stand-alone DAE yields
an average accuracy of 69.14% across the same noise range.
Figure 8 shows the accuracy of the cascaded architectures
at each experimented noise value and reveals that none of
the cascaded defenses outperforms the stand-alone DAE at
any tested level of noise.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The effectiveness of both the DAE and dimensionality
reduction using an autoencoder can be attributed to au-
toencoders abilities to effectively compress data. Through-
out these experiments, our autoencoder architectures were
designed to compress the input into a desired, reduced
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Fig. 8: Results for Black Box FG Attack with a cascaded
DAE and Dimensionality Reduction defense.
dimensional representation, and then reconstruct an ap-
proximately equivalent version of the input at the output.
Our experiments confirmed that DAEs trained to combat
l∞ bounded attacks are effective in denoising l2 bounded
attacks due to the architecture being trained to accurately
map larger corruptions, compared to l2 bounded attacks, to
the original data value. Lastly, our experiments confirmed
that a DAE is capable of denoising perturbations on our
entire tested noise range, even though we are training it
using only perturbations on the scale of η = 0.25. This
reveals that, with relatively little training data, the defender
can effectively denoise higher and lower perturbation levels
than what its training set consisted of.
In the case of applying an autoencoder for dimensionality
reduction, for both the stand-alone and cascaded defense,
we observe that the value of k, which produces the most
robust defense, is not standard across attack environments.
This phenomenon is due to several factors including, but
not limited to, the training data, the classifier architecture,
and the training parameters. The exploration of fine-tuning
an optimal reduced dimensional representation was outside
the scope of this work, but it will lead the direction of
future work. As a preliminary attempt to extend this work,
we compared our autoencoder-based dimensionality reduc-
tion method with Principal Component Analysis (PCA),
and the initial results strongly suggest that using deeper
autoencoders for dimensionality reduction and fine tuning
other network parameters, as discussed above, could result
in higher defense accuracies than using PCA alone. As a
result, we believe that the potential of the proposed cascaded
defense would be more significant in such scenarios.
Overall, our experiments revealed novel defense mecha-
nisms capable of combatting adversarial attacks on neural
network classifiers. The DAE can deliver a significant gain
in accuracy for corrupted data, as compared to using no
defense, as well as retain high accuracy levels when process-
ing benign inputs. Further, this paper showed that shallow
autoencoder networks used to reduce the dimensionality of
the input is another effective defense against adversarial
attacks Finally, our cascaded architecture, consisting of
the DAE followed by dimensionality reduction for various
values, proved to be more effective than either stand-alone
defense when the attacker introduced the FGS attack, but it
showed to be slightly less robust than using the DAE alone
when inducing the FG attack.
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